Martin Heidegger\u27s phenomenology and the science of mind by Hollingsworth, Charles Dale
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Master's Theses Graduate School
2005
Martin Heidegger's phenomenology and the
science of mind
Charles Dale Hollingsworth
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, cholli6@lsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in LSU
Master's Theses by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hollingsworth, Charles Dale, "Martin Heidegger's phenomenology and the science of mind" (2005). LSU Master's Theses. 2713.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_theses/2713
MARTIN HEIDEGGER’S PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE OF 
MIND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Master of Arts 
 
In 
 
The Department of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
Charles Dale Hollingsworth 
B.A., Mississippi State University, 2003 
May 2005 
 ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Abstract.......................................................................................iii 
 
Chapter 
1 The Computational Model of Mind and its Critics..........1 
 
2 One Attempt at a Heideggerean Approach to Cognitive 
Science...........................................................................14 
 
 
3 Heidegger on Scientific Experiments............................25 
 
4 Phenomenology and Cognitive Science:  Toward a 
Reconciliation................................................................36 
 
Bibliography................................................................................47 
 
Vita..............................................................................................48 
 iii 
Abstract 
 
 Phenomenology and cognitive science present two very different ways of looking 
at mental activity.  Recently, however, there have been some attempts to incorporate 
phenomenological insights and methods into cognitive science, drawing especially on the 
works of Martin Heidegger.  The purpose of this thesis is to determine if a useful 
combination of cognitive science with Heidegger’s phenomenology is possible, and to 
determine the form such a combination might take. 
This thesis begins with a brief overview of the field of cognitive science, and of 
some of the problems within the field that might benefit from a phenomenological 
analysis.  It then reviews Winograd and Flores’ attempt to rethink cognitive science in 
Heideggerean terms.  Next, Heidegger’s work is analyzed in order to see how scientific 
experimentation is viewed in his phenomenology.  Finally, this thesis argues that any 
useful attempt at reconciling cognitive science and phenomenology must start from a 
phenomenological, rather than a scientific, standpoint. 
1 
Chapter 1 
The Computational Model of Mind and its Critics 
 
 
1.1  Introduction  
 
 Contemporary analytic philosophy of mind is closely linked to the discipline 
known as cognitive science, perhaps the most popular contemporary attempt at a 
scientific study of the mind.  At the same time, most continental philosophy can trace its 
origins back to the phenomenological movement of the early twentieth century.  Both 
cognitive science and phenomenology deal with questions of what it means to be human, 
and how we are able to interact with one another and with the world.  Yet the two fields 
follow very different methodologies, and sometimes arrive at very different conclusions.  
Nevertheless, attempts have been made at reconciling the differences between the 
cognitive and phenomenological approaches, in the hopes of arriving at a more complete 
picture of human experience.  This thesis will examine the views of the human mind 
offered by both cognitive science and phenomenology, paying special attention to the 
phenomenology of the early Heidegger, in order to see if there is anything to be gained 
by combining the two fields. 
 
1.2  A brief history of cognitive science 
 The term “cognitive science” refers broadly to a movement within 
psychology and related fields over the last half-century which aims at a scientific 
understanding of mental activity.  It is difficult to give a strict definition of the term, as its 
2 
usage varies greatly, and nearly any discipline or theory related to the scientific study of 
the mind has at some point been labeled “cognitive science.”  For the sake of simplicity 
and uniformity, I shall apply the term as it is used by Howard Gardner in The Mind’s New 
Science:  A History of the Cognitive Revolution.  Gardner’s book is widely recognized as 
a solid introduction to the field of cognitive science, and the following overview is 
largely derived from that work. 
 Cognitive science can be seen largely as a reaction to the failures of two 
previous attempts at explaining human thought:  introspective psychology and 
behaviorism.  Introspective psychology presupposes the ability of a subject to examine 
the contents of his or her own consciousness.  One of the early proponents of this 
approach was Franz Brentano.  Brentano saw the mind as an active agent, and the 
primary object of psychology as the intentional act, a mental act directed at some object.  
For Brentano, the mind was not something that could be observed from the outside in the 
manner of a scientific experiment.  Instead, one must become aware of one’s own 
phenomenal experience in the course of one’s everyday life (Gardner 101-2).  Brentano is 
probably best known today as one of the major influences on Edmund Husserl, and is 
generally considered the forerunner of the field of phenomenology.  The emphasis on 
lived experience and a distrust of scientific “objectivity” have continued to be hallmarks 
of the phenomenological approach. 
 Another major figure in the history of introspective psychology is Wilhelm 
Wundt.  Like Brentano, Wundt felt that psychology was properly concerned with 
conscious experience.  Unlike Brentano, however, Wundt believed that some measure of 
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scientific objectivity was needed if psychology was to produce reliable results.  Wundt 
championed the idea of psychology as an endeavor carried out by trained observers who 
have learned to chronicle their own inner experiences accurately and objectively.  
Philosophically, Wundt was an heir to the British empiricist tradition, preserving Hume’s 
distinction between impressions and ideas; introspection’s task was to analyze one’s 
complex ideas and identify the impressions with which they were associated (Gardner 
102-4).  Wundt’s program fell out of favor when psychologists began questioning the 
reliability of introspection, as well as the empiricist assumption that all ideas are the 
product of impressions, and therefore available to one’s conscious introspection.  A new 
breed of psychologists emerged who posited that a great deal of mental activity might be 
unconscious, and that psychology ought not confine itself to studies of mental imagery 
(106). 
 The pinnacle of the anti-introspective movement within psychology was 
behaviorism, perhaps best known for its “black box” approach to the psyche:  no attempt 
is made to posit mental entities such as thoughts, ideas, and emotions, or to provide a 
physical basis for cognition through the study of neuroanatomy.  Instead, cognition is 
analyzed purely in terms of stimuli and responses.  Through a series of meticulously 
designed experiments, the behavioral psychologist attempts to determine the 
correspondence between the various stimuli (or sensations) experienced by an organism 
to that organism’s responses (actions, behaviors).  The organism (human or animal) is 
seen as being essentially passive:  its range of behaviors consists entirely of reactions to 
changes in its environment.   
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 Behaviorism was important because it represented a shift in the perception 
of psychology from Geisteswissenschaft to Naturwissenschaft.  Behavioral psychology 
shared with the natural sciences the assumption that the objects of its study were 
governed by a set of rules, and that these rules could be discovered through the process of 
scientific experiment.  It also resisted the tendency to draw a sharp line between animal 
and human behavior:  humans were seen as following the same pattern of stimulus and 
response as any animal.  Finally, behaviorism dismissed any talk of “free will” or 
subjective experience as unscientific, preferring to describe human and animal cognition 
from a detached, third-person perspective. 
 As important as behaviorism was, it ultimately failed to produce a 
completely convincing model of behavior, especially with respect to humans.   
Behavioral psychologists were at a loss to explain how a simple correspondence between 
stimuli and responses could account for a wide range of incredibly complex human 
behaviors.  Critics such as Karl Lashley and Noam Chomsky demonstrated that certain 
phenomena, such as the acquisition and use of language, could not be accurately 
explained in behaviorist terms.  Eventually it became clear that any truly scientific 
approach to explaining human cognition must eschew the “black box” approach in favor 
of a more complex model of the mind.  The successor movement to behaviorism, which 
sought to provide such a model, became known as cognitive science. 
 Cognitive scientists strive for a “middle ground” of interpretation.  Unlike 
eliminative materialists such as “neurophilosophers” Paul and Patricia Churchland, they 
do not attempt to explain human behavior purely in terms of neuroanatomy or brain 
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chemistry, a move which would effectively reduce psychology to biology, or even 
chemistry and physics.  Yet unlike the behaviorists, cognitive scientists do not treat the 
mind as a “black box” to be analyzed purely in terms of inputs and outputs.  One of the 
hallmarks of cognitive science is “the assumption that, for scientific purposes, human 
cognitive activity must be described in terms of symbols, schemas, images, ideas, and 
other forms of mental representation” (Gardner 39). 
 A second distinguishing feature of cognitive science is its close relationship 
to the field of computer science.  Most cognitive scientists share the assumption that 
human and animal cognition are at least in some way analogous to the information 
processing and decision-making which takes place inside a digital computer.  Of 
particular interest is the field of artificial intelligence, the attempt to simulate human 
cognition with computer software.  Most artificial intelligence systems are designed to 
perform a certain task without concern for verisimilitude – for example, a computer 
vision system designed to scan airports for wanted fugitives might bear little or no 
resemblance to the human vision system.  More important for cognitive science is the 
intersection between artificial intelligence and experimental psychology, in which 
computers are designed to mimic as closely as possible the actual mental processes of 
human beings.  The importance of artificial intelligence to cognitive science, and the 
extent to which computers and human minds are similar, are points of contention among 
cognitive scientists.   
Proponents of the computational model of mind are inclined to see the 
human brain and a digital computer as essentially similar in kind.  Under this model, 
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human reasoning is procedural and rule-based, just like a computer program; the task of 
the cognitive scientist is to “reverse-engineer” the human mind, or to attempt to decipher 
the program which gives rise to human behavior.  Crucial to the computational model of 
mind is the distinction between software – symbolic representations of information and 
an encoded set of rules for processing those symbols – and hardware, or the machinery on 
which the software is implemented.  Under the computational model, the term “mind” is 
associated with software, the proper domain of the cognitive scientist, while “brain” 
refers to the hardware, the domain of neuroscience.  In order to explain some mental 
activity under the computational model, it is sufficient to produce an algorithm, or 
software-level description; there is no need to describe cognition at the hardware level in 
terms of physical brain activity. 
 The computational model’s distinction between software and hardware, or 
mind and brain, may seem reminiscent of the mind-body distinction drawn by Descartes.  
However, there are important differences between the substance dualism of Descartes and 
the mind-brain distinction as understood by cognitive science.  Software and hardware, or 
mind and brain, represent different levels of abstraction, rather than distinct metaphysical 
entities.  As an analogy, consider the disciplines of physics and chemistry:  a given 
system can be described in chemical or in physical terms, yet both approaches describe 
the same system.  Furthermore, any chemical description is, at least in theory, reducible 
to a physical description: a chemical reaction between, say, an acid and a base can also be 
described in terms of electron exchanges between ions or molecules.  The fact that 
chemistry and physics represent separate, though related, disciplines means that one 
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might be able to arrive at a satisfactory chemical description of a reaction even before the 
underlying physics is understood.  The science of chemistry was already quite advanced 
before the modern (physical ) model of the atom was developed.  Likewise, it is 
conceivable that a cognitive scientist can produce a satisfactory model of the mind even 
without fully understanding the underlying neuroscience. 
 There is an interesting and philosophically important consequence of the 
mind/brain distinction under the computational model.  Computer programs generally 
have a degree of platform independence – the same program may be implemented on 
various different types of hardware.  For example, a simple addition algorithm that 
produces the sum of two numbers might be implemented on a mechanical adding 
machine, a pocket calculator, a desktop computer, or even a human brain.  The exact 
physical states of the hardware are irrelevant, as long as there is a direct causal 
correlation between the physical states of the hardware and the formal states of the 
computation.1  Since, under the computational model of mind, the mind is only a 
specialized type of computation, this means that any properly configured system, whether 
natural or artificial, could be said to possess a mind simply by implementing the right 
computation. 
 One of the standard questions in analytic philosophy of mind is the 
“problem of other minds,” the question of whether one can justifiably overcome 
solipsism and assert that there exist other beings capable of possessing thoughts or mental 
states.  For the believer in the computational model of mind, this problem is fairly easily 
                                                
1For a more detailed discussion of what is required for a physical system to implement a program, see 
David J. Chalmers' “On Implementing a Computation” from Minds and Machines (1994). 
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solved:  to have a mind is to implement a computation which performs certain mental 
tasks.  Any physical system which implements such a computation – i. e., which is 
functionally equivalent at the software level to the human brain – can be said to have a 
mind.  This means not only that we can attribute mental states to other humans; it also 
implies that we could justifiably attribute mental states to a computer, provided it is 
running the right program.  By accepting the computational model of mind, one is easily 
led to accept the strong interpretation of artificial intelligence:  AI software is more than a 
simple simulation of thought – it is thought, and a sufficiently advanced AI might even be 
considered a person. 
 
1.3  Critics of the computational model 
 Many philosophers have been reluctant to accept the implications of the 
computational model of mind; to them it seems that there is a fundamental difference 
between human thought and the rote rule-based behavior of digital computers.  One of 
the most famous criticisms of the computational model of mind comes from John Searle.  
In “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Searle introduces his “Chinese Room” thought 
experiment to demonstrate the dissimilarity between computer information processing 
and human thought.  He takes as his inspiration a computer program by Roger Schank, 
which is capable of reading English-language stories and producing correct answers to a 
limited range of questions about the stories.  Some proponents of strong artificial 
intelligence might say that Schank’s program actually understands English, at least to 
some degree, and that what occurs when the program answers questions about stories is 
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essentially the same as what occurs when a human answers the same questions (Searle 
183-4).  To show that the computer does not actually understand anything, Searle asks us 
to consider the following scenario:  A human being with no knowledge of the Chinese 
language is placed in a room along with a stack of cards, on which are written various 
instructions.  Through a slot in the door, someone outside the room passes a story written 
in Chinese, along with questions about the story, also in Chinese.  By following the 
instructions written on the cards – instructions which involve nothing more than the 
manipulation of symbols – the person inside the room is able to write Chinese characters 
onto a piece of paper and pass it through the slot to the outside.  To a native Chinese 
speaker outside the room, the symbols on the paper appear to be accurate and 
grammatically correct Chinese-language replies to the questions about the story.  The 
Chinese speaker might be tempted to conclude that the person inside the room 
understands Chinese.  Yet the inhabitant of the room does not; all he has been doing was 
manipulating symbols, with no knowledge of their meaning (184-6). 
 Searle’s thought experiment appeals to our intuitions about the nature of 
cognition in order to convince us that computation is not the same thing as thinking.  
However, it is difficult to tell exactly how they differ in Searle’s view.  It is clear, for 
example, that Searle does not wish to return to Cartesian substance dualism by imagining 
a reified mental substance possessed by humans but not computers; in fact, he accuses the 
proponents of the computational model of advocating a form of dualism themselves 
(203).  Nor does Searle simply presuppose that machines cannot think.  On the contrary, 
he asserts “that only a machine could think, and indeed only very special kinds of 
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machines, namely brains and machines that had the same causal powers as brains” (203).  
Whatever makes thought possible for Searle must be compatible with a materialistic and 
mechanistic world-view. 
 Surprisingly, the “missing ingredient” of human thought is a concept more 
typically associated with phenomenology than cognitive science:  intentionality.  Searle 
argues against the mind-software/brain-hardware analogy by saying that “the same 
program could have all sorts of crazy realizations which have no form of intentionality.”  
Any of a variety of mechanical systems could instantiate a program which responds to 
questions about Chinese stories, but non-biological machines “are the wrong kind of stuff 
to have intentionality in the first place (only something that has the same causal powers 
as brains can have intentionality)”.  Intentional states, says Searle, “are defined in term of 
their content, not their form” (200). 
 Searle’s main concern seems to be that, in the case of computer information 
processing as well as the rule-following person in the Chinese room, symbols are being 
processed strictly as symbols, with no attention being paid to their meaning.  His usage of 
the term “intentionality” implies more than simply being-directed-toward (for a computer 
can in a sense be said to be “directed toward” its data, just as a camera can be “directed 
toward” its subject), but a sort of concernful dealing.  For one to understand information 
– as opposed to merely processing it – one must be engaged with it in more than a 
superficial manner; the information has to mean something.  Searle’s dissatisfactions with 
the computational theory of mind hint at a phenomenological understanding, yet Searle is 
firmly committed to a scientific world view.  Intentionality for Searle must come from 
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the brain, not from a Cartesian ego or other such metaphysical entity.  Thus he must rely 
on the nebulous concept of “causal powers” – something he never adequately defines – to 
explain how intentionality arises from the human brain.  Whatever these causal powers 
are, Searle apparently believes it is up to biology to find them:  “Whatever else 
intentionality is, it is a biological phenomenon, and it is as likely to be causally dependent 
on the specific biochemistry of its origins as are lactation, photosynthesis, or any other 
biological phenomena” (204).  The notion that biology can account for phenomenology is 
an interesting one, and we shall later investigate it at length.  Nevertheless, there is 
something ultimately unsatisfactory about Searle’s critique.  Like Brentano, and the 
phenomenologists after him, Searle sees intentionality as an integral feature of mental 
activity; however, his insistence on preserving the materialistic and mechanistic 
assumptions of cognitive science lead him to posit some vague “power” to explain 
intentionality. 
 Another critic of the standard view of cognitive science is Rodney Brooks.  
As a robotics researcher, Brooks does not share Searle’s view that intelligence is a strictly 
biological phenomenon, or that intentionality is something of which machines are not 
capable.  He does, however, question the emphasis within the field of artificial 
intelligence on knowledge representation.  Traditional artificial intelligence (what John 
Haugeland refers to as “good old-fashioned AI” or “GOFAI”) takes a fairly Humean 
view of cognition:  sensory inputs (impressions) are converted to data (simple ideas) 
which might be processed at various levels of abstraction (complex ideas).  A robot 
which was designed to find its way around a room, for example, might be equipped with 
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a vision system designed to take the raw input from a camera and search for specific 
objects with labels like “chair” and “door”.  Its programming would contain instructions 
like “move around the chair and toward the door.”  For Brooks, this representationalist 
approach is far removed from the way actual humans and animals interact with the world, 
and deals in needless abstractions. 
 Brooks contends that “reasoning,” the type of thought which deals mainly 
with abstractions and representations, is far from the most basic form of cognitive 
activity, and that much behavior can be explained in much simpler terms.  He uses an 
example first proposed by Herbert Simon:  an ant walking along a beach might appear to 
be following a very complex path, but the complexity is really only a reflection of the 
complexity of the ant’s environment (Brooks 418).  The ant simply reacts to obstacles in 
its path by walking around them; this behavior is made to seem more complicated 
because of the great variety of the terrain.  Brooks’ approach to explaining human and 
animal behavior is not to conceive of a central computational system which performs 
logical operations on mental representations, but rather to propose a number of simple 
systems working in parallel, which are concerned more with action than with information 
processing. 
 Unlike many artificial intelligence systems, Brooks’ robots (which he calls 
“Creatures,” referring to the fact that they are designed in imitation of simpler animals 
like insects and reptiles rather than humans) are not designed to operate in a special 
laboratory environment, but in the real world:  “on power-up, they exist in the world and 
interact with it” (408). Traditional AI systems, for Brooks,  “are not participating in a 
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world at all” (416) but rather deal exclusively with the “model world” which has been 
programmed into them in order to serve as a representation.  The individual systems 
which make up a Creature are extremely simple:  a Creature designed to move toward a 
light source might have a light-following system that simply turns the Creature toward 
the brightest light source, and an obstacle-avoiding system which can override the other 
system and turn the Creature away from objects in its path.  None of the individual 
systems meets the traditional definition of “cognition,” but, acting in concert, they 
manage to produce behavior which seems goal-oriented and intelligent. 
 Many features of Brooks’ approach to cognitive science – the emphasis on 
embodiment, the notion that a Creature must have a “world,” the rejection of mental 
representations – are reminiscent of the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger as 
described in his Being and Time.  Brooks responds to this comparison by saying that he 
was not specifically inspired by Heidegger, but does not object to his work “being used in 
philosophical debate as an example on any side of any fence” (415).  The fact that Brooks 
was not inspired by Heidegger – that he arrived, through engineering research, at many of 
the same conclusions Heidegger arrived at through phenomenological investigation, 
suggests that the possibility of cooperation between the fields of cognitive science and 
phenomenology might not be completely farfetched.  If so, scientific experimentation 
might be able to provide insights to phenomenologists, and phenomenology might help 
inspire scientific research.  In fact, some attempts have been made at combining cognitive 
science and phenomenology, and we will next take a detailed look at one such attempt in 
particular. 
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Chapter 2 
One Attempt at a Heideggerean Approach to Cognitive Science 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
 Martin Heidegger's Being and Time presents a detailed phenomenological 
account of human existence, and challenges many assumptions about the nature of 
perception, knowledge, and activity.  In recent years this work has gained attention from 
within fields such as cognitive science and analytic philosophy of mind, which have 
traditionally stressed a view of human existence which is thoroughly non-
phenomenological.  It is hoped by some within these traditions that Heidegger's analysis 
would be helpful in clearing up some of the perceived problems generated by 
computational or representational theories of cognition.  Terry Winograd and Fernando 
Flores, in their book Understanding Computers And Cognition, attempt to replace the 
standard cognitive model with one inspired, in part, by Heidegger; however, the result is 
ultimately disappointing.  By failing to appreciate Heidegger's attempt at an analysis 
which is both primordial and pre-theoretical, and instead treating his work as one theory 
of mind among several, Winograd and Flores overlook the most important and 
distinguishing features of Heidegger's philosopy.  The result is an account which bears 
superficial similarities to Heidegger, but is still thoroughly grounded within the very 
tradition they seek to criticize. 
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2.2  Winograd and Flores’ Understanding Computers and Cognition 
 Winograd and Flores use the term “rationalistic tradition” to denote the 
prevailing view which they claim has produced the assumptions behind current theories 
of cognition.  This is not to be confused with the “rationalism” of Descartes or Leibniz, 
though those thinkers can be placed within that tradition; rather, the “rationalistic 
tradition” refers to the methodological assumptions which are to some degree shared by 
Western thought as a whole.  They identify three steps in this methodology:  a 
characterization “in terms of identifiable objects with well-defined properties,” the search 
for “general rules that apply to situations in terms of those objects and properties,” and 
the attempt to “Apply the rules logically to the situation of concern, drawing conclusions 
about what should be done” (Winograd 15).  They will then “attempt to show the non-
obviousness of the rationalistic orientation and [. . .] reveal the blindness that it 
generates” (17). 
 In the field of cognitive science, the rationalistic tradition takes the form of 
the computational model of mind.  This model stems from the assumption that cognition 
is a special case of symbol manipulation, such as takes place within digital computers.  A 
cognitive system (such as a human being) gathers information about the world which is 
stored in the mind in the form of symbolic representations.  These representations are 
then manipulated according to an internal set of rules, of which the individual himself 
may not be consciously aware.  The end result of this symbol manipulation is an action 
on the part of the cognitive system.  Cognitive science thus becomes a matter of “reverse 
engineering,” or attempting to discover the mental program which converts perceptions to 
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actions:  “A theory of cognition can be couched as a program in an appropriate symbolic 
formalism such that the program when run in the appropriate environment will produce 
the observed behavior” (25). 
 As its name implies, cognitive science takes cognition to be the fundamental 
mode of human involvement with the world.  Even in our everyday practical activities we 
are assumed to be performing some form of cognition.  If a cognitive scientist wishes, for 
example, to explain how I am able to perform a simple task like opening a door, he would 
do so in computational and representational terms.  The task would be broken down into 
broad subtasks like perception and action.  Perception might involve some form of 
pattern recognition in which I compare the raw data of my vision to a mental 
representation of a door, in order to identify the object before me as a door and locate its 
knob.  Action would take the form of an algorithm which calculates the precise way in 
which I need to move my arm in order to make contact with the doorknob, turn it, and 
push the door open.  I am of course not consciously performing these calculations.  They 
are assumed to take place in some form in my brain, and it is the task of cognitive science 
to uncover them. 
 It is not hard to see that this view of the primacy of cognition runs counter to 
Heidegger's philosophy.  He describes cognition “as a founded mode of Being-in-the 
world” (BT 101).  In other words, however important it might be, cognition is not the 
primordial mode in which we are engaged with the world.  Cognition treats objects as 
present-at-hand, as mere things.  In treating this mode of being as primordial, traditional 
cognitive science assumes that there must be some way to explain everyday activities in 
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terms of dealings with mere things.  The door is first a meaningless collection of sense 
data before I see it as a door, and there must first be a series of kinematic calculations 
before I can move my arm to open it.  But for Heidegger, instrumentality is more 
primordial than cognition:  “The kind of dealing which is closest to us is as we have 
shown, not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates 
things and puts them to use; and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'” (BT 95).   
 Winograd and Flores agree that the computational, representationalist model 
does not give an accurate account of human cognition.  They turn instead to Heidegger 
because of his view “that cognition is not based on the systematic manipulation of 
representations.”  However, they are careful to distinguish their own work from that of 
other followers of Heidegger, such as Dreyfus and Haugeland, which “seem at first sight 
to deny the physical basis of human action.”  The link by which they seek to connect the 
Heideggerian non-representational stance with a physical model of cognition lies in the 
works of neurobiologist Humberto Maturana, who “sets out a conceptual framework in 
which phenomena of interpretation arise as a necessary consequence of the structure of 
biological beings” (Winograd 10). 
 In one passage, for example, Winograd and Flores criticize the 
representationalist stance by making use of Heidegger's distinction between 
instrumentality and objectivity: 
The common sense of our tradition is that in order to perceive and relate to 
things, we must have some content in our minds that corresponds to our 
knowledge of them.  If we focus on concernful activity instead of on 
detached contemplation, the status of this  representation is called into 
question.  In driving a nail with a hammer (as opposed to thinking about a 
hammer), I need not make use of any explicit representation of the hammer.  
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My ability to act comes from  my familiarity with hammering, not my 
knowledge of a hammer (Winograd 33). 
 
 However, Winograd and Flores do not stop with Heidegger.  Working as 
they are from within the scientific tradition, they feel the need to bolster this 
interpretation with biological evidence.  Such evidence is provided by Maturana, who, in 
studying the vision system of the frog, found that it did not simply transmit raw images to 
the brain, but rather performed certain functions previously thought to be the domain of 
cognition.  For example, a particular type of optic nerve fiber “responded best to a small 
dark spot surrounded by light,” such as a fly would appear (Winograd 41).  This indicated 
that the frog's fly-catching activities did not necessarily depend on a mental concept or 
representation of “fly,” but were instead at least partly the result of non-cognitive activity 
in the vision system itself. 
 Another of Maturana's experiments involves a setup wherein a stick is 
illuminated on one side by a white light, and on another by a red light.  One of the 
shadows cast by the stick appears green to a human observer, despite the fact that no light 
of the green wavelength can be detected.  This led him to postulate “that the patterns of 
neural activity produced are the same as those produced by light of a single wavelength 
normally called green” (Winograd 41).  From these and other examples, Winograd and 
Flores conclude that the nervous system is “a generator of phenomena, rather than [. . .] a 
filter on the mapping of reality” (42). 
 Are these neurological accounts true to the spirit of Heidegger's analysis of 
Dasein?  Has Maturana provided experimental verification of Heidegger's anti-
representationalist stance?  If we begin from a truly Heideggerian standpoint, the answer 
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to the first question must be negative, and the second question should not even have been 
asked.  Unlike Heidegger, Winograd and Flores are not practicing phenomenology, but 
instead attempting to borrow phenomenological concepts for use in an enterprise which is 
still fundamentally scientific.  Their failure lies in not realizing that scientific activity is 
itself a particular mode of engagement.  Scientific evidence cannot be used to bolster 
phenomenological claims, for it is the phenomena themselves to which science must 
remain truthful. 
 Modern science, to Heidegger, is a founded mode, a particular type of 
investigation which is non-primordial.  The transition from ancient to modern science 
was a metaphysical shift characterized by a change in the types of entities with which 
science was concerned.  Whereas in its ordinary everydayness Dasein is concerned with 
tools and items of equipment, which are associated with a range of activities, occupy a 
space determined by those activities, and each have their proper place within that space, 
science deals only with objects occupying a uniform, Cartesian space-time.  “The 
theoretical attitude,” writes Trish Glazebrook, “homogenizes not just space and time but 
also the bodies that are the objects of physics.  It homogenizes the objects of physics by 
projecting their thinghood alike.  For it is the thinghood of things that is understood 
beforehand in the theoretical attitude” (55).  Winograd and Flores may want to escape 
this theoretical attitude and return to ordinary everydayness; however, in their desire to 
find a “physical basis” for human action, they reveal that they have not truly arrived at a 
primordial understanding.  The hammer which I use to mend my roof is no less physical 
than the nerve fiber under a microscope; it is simply revealed in a pre-scientific manner.  
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Nevertheless, Winograd and Flores look to neurological evidence to explain 
instrumentality.  They are attempting to ground Being-in-the-world in a scientific 
understanding, even as that very scientific understanding is itself founded on Being-in-
the-world! 
 
2.3  Science versus Phenomenology 
 Science, as a general rule, begins with the obvious, and then seeks to dig 
beneath superficial appearances in order to find a deeper explanation.  Thus chemistry 
proceeds from observations of quantities of chemicals to theories about interactions 
between molecules, and physiology moves from the observation of an animal's 
appearance and behavior to theories about blood vessels and muscle fibers.  So it is with 
cognitive science:  the ordinary activities of human beings are only the surface, and the 
task of the scientist is to uncover the mental rules or programs which produce this 
activity.  The cognitive scientist will often find that the easiest task, such as opening a 
door or identifying the face of a friend, is the most difficult to specify in computational 
terms. 
Phenomenology, on the other hand, has as its foundation that which is the 
most obvious:  the phenomena of experience themselves.  It reacts against the tendency 
of Descartes or Kant to posit some thing “behind” the perception, or to identify the 
genesis of phenomena in categories within the mind.  Instead of formulating a theory that 
best explains the observations, the phenomenologist strives to make sure that his  
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observations lay bare the phenomena without being covered over by theory.  It seems 
difficult to imagine an approach more different from scientific investigation. 
 Does this mean that cognitive science and phenomenology represent two 
distinct and fundamentally irreconcilable approaches?  Not necessarily.  But it does mean 
that we need to clarify the goals of each form of investigation, and identify the types of 
entities with which they will be concerned.  If we assume that both Heidegger's analysis 
of Dasein and the neuroscientist's study of the brain and nervous system are attempts to 
understand the workings of the mind, and that both have the mind or consciousness as 
their object of study, we will have little if any success trying to reconcile the two.  But 
Heidegger is not attempting a study of mind, and his analysis is not something superficial 
which needs to be supported by further scientific evidence.  His subject, Dasein, is more 
fundamental than either mind or consciousness. 
 Heidegger wastes no time outlining the scope of his investigation.  He 
begins Division I of Being and Time with these words:  “We are ourselves the entities to 
be analysed” (BT 67).  What follows is to be an account of who we are, not within the 
confines of a theory of mind, but in all our modes of being.  Heidegger takes care to 
distinguish this “we” from the objects of science:  “Sciences are ways of Being in which 
Dasein comports itself towards entities which it need not be itself” (BT 33).  By this he 
does not mean the obvious fact that science can study beings which differ ontically from 
us, such as planets or microbes; the important distinction is ontological.  The objects of 
science appear in a different way than Dasein itself, even if we are studying the human 
brain.  Science objectifies; it studies entities as separate things in their own right.  “But to 
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Dasein,” says Heidegger, “Being in a world is something that belongs essentially” (BT 
33).  Winograd and Flores are rightly suspicious of a theory of mind which treats the 
isolated human subject as a separate object which must relate to the world through 
representations.  But the scientific study of nerve fibers is just as objective, and just as 
distant from a true study of Dasein. 
 
2.4 Meaning versus Explanation  
As we have seen, cognitive science is primarily concerned with the 
explanation of human behavior.  A model of cognition succeeds if it can account for a set 
of actions given a particular set of stimuli.  The fact that the mental representations and 
algorithms of theories of cognition have no obvious correlates within conscious 
experience is untroubling to most cognitive scientists.  Theirs is a world of objects; 
human beings are just the particular objects within that world which they choose to study. 
 In contrast, Heidegger is concerned from the start with meaning.  It is “the 
question of the meaning [Sinn] of Being” (BT 19) which guides his entire project in Being 
and Time.  No theoretical explanation of behavior, no matter how detailed, ever 
constitutes “meaning” for Heidegger.  “Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of 
something maintains itself [. . .] The concept of meaning embraces the formal existential 
framework of what necessarily belongs to that which an understanding interpretation 
Articulates” (193).  He goes on to explain that meaning is not a property of entities, but 
belongs essentially to Dasein.  Hence any investigation which does not begin with 
Dasein, which concerns itself only with the scientific study of entities – whether 
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traditional cognitive science or the neurophysiology of Maturana – can never truly arrive 
at meaning. 
 Magda King's commentary on Being and Time offers a straightforward 
example of the process of finding meaning.  If we are told that an unfamiliar building is a 
“theater,” that explanation has meaning to us only insofar as we understand “that it is a 
building for the production of plays”.  This in turn only has meaning in terms of our 
understanding of the range of human activities involved in the production of plays.  
Ultimately, it is the “world of human existence” which gives meaning to the theater 
(King 6). 
 King goes on to explain meaning in terms of the horizon:  “The world of our 
own existence is the horizon in which our everyday understanding moves” (6).  Once we 
become engaged in, say, the pursuit of theoretical physics, our horizon shifts:  “The 
horizon from which things are now understood is the substantiality of matter” (6).  Thus, 
insofar as he is practicing science, the scientist finds meaning only within this particular 
domain.  Ordinary everydayness is not “meaningful” to him for this task.  Yet even 
experimental data are meaningful only by virtue of the fact that they belong to Dasein. 
 Cognitive science would then seem to have a unique problem.  It seeks to 
explain the entire range of human behavior.  This includes the activities of ordinary 
everydayness.  So, in a sense, these things are meaningful to the cognitive scientist in a 
way that they would not be to the theoretical physicist.  This does not change the fact that 
he operates within a particular horizon which includes only objective entities, and within 
which he himself as Dasein does not appear.  Instrumentality, care, all the things which 
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are most important to Heidegger's analysis, are not to be found in the scientific mode of 
investigation.  They are, however, in a sense present as absent.  When we “bracket off” 
our everyday concerns, they do not disappear.  They continue to come into play even as 
we turn our attention towards the objects of science. 
 If any attempt to combine the insights of Heidegger's phenomenology with 
the discoveries of science is to be truly successful, it cannot proceed by attempting to 
explain Dasein in scientific terms.  Phenomenological investigation must come first, and 
it must serve to illuminate our scientific investigations in the light of the existential 
analytic of Dasein.  With their attention to hermeneutics and their critique of the 
“rationalistic” assumptions of cognitive science, Winograd and Flores believe they have 
done just that.  However, any progress they might have made is destroyed when they turn 
to the neurological studies of Maturana in an attempt to provide a physical basis for the 
mind.  They have replaced a model which concerns itself with mental representations 
with one concerned with nerve cells, and have taken what rightfully belongs to Dasein 
and placed it within a biological substratum.  They rightly question the assumptions 
which led to the unsatisfactory picture of human existence painted by traditional 
cognitive science, but would do well to question their own assumptions.  The analysis 
presented by Winograd and Flores can help us make some progress in reconciling the 
phenomenological account of human existence with the psychological, but in order to be 
truly successful, we must incorporate phenomenology on a much more fundamental 
level. 
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Chapter 3 
Heidegger on Scientific Experiments 
 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 If phenomenology is to be reconciled with the scientific study of the mind in 
a way that does justice to phenomenology, we must not begin from within the scientific 
world-view.  Instead, we must from the start be true to the aims and goals of 
phenomenology, and strive to find a way to view scientific data phenomenologically.  
Fortunately for us, Heidegger did not avoid discussing scientific experiments.  Part Two 
of his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics deals with the question of whether animals 
are “world-poor,” and in the process of investigating this question Heidegger draws 
heavily on biological experiments.  Before we look at Heidegger’s take on the natural 
sciences, we must examine the concepts and questions that led him to make use of 
scientific data. 
 
3.2  The relationship between philosophy and zoology 
 Heidegger does not begin his investigations from a starting point which 
assumes the existence of material entities as investigated by the sciences -- a perspective 
which makes it difficult to account for subjective experience.  Nor does he begin from a 
Cartesian ego that must prove the existence of the outside world.  In Being and Time he 
writes, “The ‘scandal of philosophy’ is not that this proof [of the existence of the external 
world] has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and 
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again” (BT 249, emphasis original).  Even if we attempt to sidestep the problem of the 
external world by claiming that the existence of the subject presupposes a world outside 
itself, we “would still be starting with the construct of an isolated subject.”  Heidegger 
dismisses both the realism and idealism of modern philosophy in favor of Dasein’s 
Being-in-the-world, where Dasein is not to be thought of as a entity within a larger set of 
entities which make up the “world.”  Rather, Dasein is identified with care, and the world 
with the scope of Dasein’s concern. 
 Since “world” occupies such a place of prominence in Heidegger’s 
phenomenology, it is vital that we elucidate just what is meant by the term.  In Being and 
Time, Heidegger states that he does not use the term in the usual sense, to mean “the 
totality of those entities which can be present-at-hand within the world.”  Instead, he 
takes “world” to mean “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’” (BT 
93).  In other words, Heidegger gives the term “world” a phenomenological significance, 
and does not mean it to denote a collection of objects.   
The task of elucidating the meaning of “world” is Heidegger’s project in 
Part Two of The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics.  He proceeds by a comparative 
examination of three theses:  “the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is 
world-forming” (185).  Heidegger begins “in the middle,” taking the thesis that the 
animal is poor in world as his starting point.  He considers whether this thesis should be 
considered a proposition of zoology, but rejects this categorization:  the statement that the 
animal is world-poor is a statement of essence, which does not simply apply to all 
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animals, but defines what an animal is.1  Thus “precisely because zoology deals with 
animals this proposition cannot be a result of zoological investigation; rather it must be 
its presupposition.  For this presupposition ultimately involves [. . .] a delimitation of the 
field within which any positive investigation of animals must move” (FCM 186).  If the 
fact that the animal is world-poor were a presupposition of zoology, it would imply that 
we could not make use of any information garnered from that field in the elucidation of 
the premise.  Must we ignore zoology entirely, and does this make the thesis an arbitrary 
one? 
 Heidegger replies in the negative:  “The proposition does not derive from 
zoology, but it cannot be elucidated independently of zoology either.  It requires a 
specific orientation toward zoology and biology in general, and yet it is not through them 
that its truth is to be determined” (FCM 187).  To our ordinary understanding, the attempt 
to establish the relationship between zoology and metaphysics is a circular movement:  
zoology provides us with the thesis that animals are world-poor, and this thesis is used as 
a foundation for zoology.  In arriving back at the starting point of our investigation, we 
have moved around the circumference of a circle.  Heidegger suggests that we might 
focus our attention on the center of this circle, rather than attempt to escape the circle 
entirely through the use of dialectic (187).  The relation between metaphysics and science 
is ambiguous, but this ambiguity is something we must be prepared to accept. 
 Heidegger claims that biology is in the position of having to defend its own 
existence, to prevent itself from being subsumed into physics or chemistry.  To do so, 
                                                
1 The definition of the animal as “world-poor” takes precedence over our everyday usage of the term 
“animal.”  Should the great apes, for example, turn out not to be poor in world, they would no longer 
rate the description “animal.” 
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biology must arrive at a conception “of the fundamental character of living beings 
themselves as something that cannot be explained or grasped at all in physico-chemical 
terms” (188).  Yet Heidegger is dismissive of anti-mechanistic movements, such as 
vitalism, which attempt to preserve the distinctive character of biology, yet labor under 
“misunderstandings as great as those that beset the mechanistic conception of life” (189). 
 Heidegger asks us to “bear in mind that all the disciplines that deal with life 
are caught up today in a remarkable transformation, the basic tendency of which is 
directed to restoring an autonomous status to life” (191).  Historically, people have 
tended to explain life “from the perspective of man,” or else “by means of laws adopted 
from the realm of material nature” (192).  Both attempts fail to secure “the essential 
nature of life in and of itself” (192, emphasis original).   
 
3.3  Animals as poor in world 
 After considering the question of the proper relationship between 
philosophy and zoology, Heidegger returns to the thesis that animals are poor in world.  
He admits that this thesis is counterintuitive in light of the work of J. von Uexküll, who 
speaks frequently of the animal’s “environmental world” (192).  Nevertheless, Heidegger 
maintains that the sphere of things to which an animal can relate as a living being is much 
smaller than that of a human:  “The bee, for example, has its hive, its cells, the blossoms 
it seeks out, and the other bees of the swarm.  The bee’s world is limited to a specific 
domain and is strictly circumscribed” (193).  The bee’s world is limited in penetrability 
as well as range:  a worker bee can know the stamens of blossoms, “but it does not know 
 29 
the stamens of these blossoms as stamens, it knows nothing about the roots of the plant 
and it cannot know anything about the number of stamens or leaves, for example” (193).  
The lack of such knowledge is not due to mere ignorance on the part of the bee, 
something that could be corrected by the bee’s coming into contact with the proper 
phenomena.  Rather, the bee is “world-poor” compared to man because it does not even 
have the possibility of knowing these phenomena. 
 Heidegger next compares the world-poverty of the animal to the world-
absence of the stone:  “Neither the stone nor the animal has world.  But this not-having of 
world is not to be understood in the same sense in each case” (196).  Whereas animals are 
deprived of world, stones are incapable even of being deprived of world.  To clarify this 
point, Heidegger accepts a provisional definition of world as “those beings which are in 
each case accessible and may be dealt with, accessible in such a way that dealing with 
such beings is possible or necessary for the kind of being pertaining to a particular being” 
(196).  A stone that is touching the earth does not bear a relationship to the earth which is 
in any way similar to that of the lizard who basks on a warm stone.  A stone is something 
that simply “turns up,” but has no access to any other beings.  In contrast, the lizard 
basking on the stone “has sought out this stone and is accustomed to doing so.  If we now 
remove the lizard from its stone, it does not simply lie where we have put it but starts 
looking for its stone again” (197).  The lizard is not one being, present at hand, among 
others; it has its own relation to the rock, which the rock can never have to another being. 
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3.4 The bee experiments 
 Heidegger delves into the question of exactly what constitutes the animal’s 
world in much greater detail with the example of the bee, and this example gives us 
perhaps the best picture of the relationship between Heidegger’s phenomenology and 
scientific experiment.  Heidegger considers the behavior of the bee as it goes in search of 
pollen.  An individual bee will become fixated on a particular type of flower, visiting 
only flowers of that type and ignoring all others, for weeks at a time.  Its search for food 
“is no mere flying about but is a flying directed toward one particular scent.”  Once the 
bee finds a drop of honey2 in a flower, it “sucks it up, stops sucking, and flies away 
again.”  Heidegger questions the reason for the bee’s behavior:  “But does the bee 
recognize the fact that the honey is no longer present?  Does it fly away because it has 
recognized this fact?”  Heidegger does not think that we should hasten to say that the bee 
has recognized the honey as present, “especially if we can and indeed must interpret the 
bee’s activity as a driven performing and as drivenness, as behaviour – as behaviour 
rather than comportment on the part of the bee toward the honey which is present or no 
longer present” (FCM 241). 
 In order to answer the question of whether the bee’s actions should be 
considered as behavior or comportment, Heidegger looks to a particular experiment:  “A 
bee was placed before a little bowl filled with so much honey that the bee was unable to 
suck up the honey all at once.  It begins to suck and then after a while breaks off this 
driven activity of sucking and flies off, leaving the rest of the honey still present in the 
                                                
2 Heidegger is probably referring to the nectar in the flower, rather than to honey, the product of the bees’ 
labor. 
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bowl.”  We are tempted to say that the bee has recognized the fact that there is more 
honey present than it can consume.  However, the experimenter then cuts away part of 
the bee’s abdomen, so that the honey, as it is consumed, runs out the back of the bee.  
Now the bee keeps consuming honey until there is no more.  The bee “recognizes neither 
[the presence of too much honey] nor even – though this would be expected to touch it 
more closely – the absence of its abdomen.  There is no question of it recognizing any of 
this, it continues with its driven activity regardless precisely because it does not recognize 
that plenty of honey is still present.  Rather, the bee is simply taken by its food” (242).   
 When the bee’s abdomen is intact, the bee quits consuming honey because it 
has become satisfied.  The bee’s “sense of satisfaction is registered as long as [. . .] the 
animal remains organically intact” and “cannot be registered in the bee if the abdomen is 
missing.”  Satiation “inhibits the bee’s driven activity,” and “is never a recognition of the 
presence of nourishment or of the amount of nourishment available” (242).  The bee’s 
feeding is an instinctual activity, and “Instinctual activity is not a recognitive self-
directing toward objectively present things, but a behaving” (243). 
 Heidegger next considers the question of how a bee finds its way back to the 
hive.   At issue is whether the bee has a “space” in the phenomenological sense.  He tells 
us that “there is orientation only where space is disclosed as such, and thus where the 
possibility of distinguishing different regions and identifiable locations within these 
regions is also given.”  Heidegger questions whether the bee “opens up a space as space 
and flies through it as its spatial flight-path” (243).   
 Heidegger considers various factors that might allow bees to find their way 
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back to the hive.  Color would seem to be a factor, since beekeepers will paint hives 
different colors so that bees do not return to the wrong hive.  Additionally, bees can 
“direct themselves according to the scent which they themselves emit” (244), allowing an 
individual bee to find the particular swarm to which it belongs.  While both color and 
scent play important rules, they are useful only over short distances, and cannot explain 
how bees are able to find their way back over a distance of several kilometers.  To answer 
this question, Heidegger again consults experimental evidence. 
 In the experiment, the beehive is moved a few meters after the bees have 
been released.  When they are ready to return home, the bees make their way to the 
empty spot where the hive had once stood.  They “now become suspicious at the empty 
spot and eventually find their hive after some searching about” (244).  The fact that the 
bees make their way first to the spot where the hive had been, but no longer was, suggests 
that some feature of the environment, rather than the color or scent of the hive itself 
guides them.  The use of trees or other objects as landmarks is ruled out, as the bees can 
successfully navigate even in barren landscapes.  One final hypothesis is proposed:  the 
bees navigate by the sun, using the angle between themselves and the sun to provide a 
sense of direction. 
 Is the sun hypothesis “simply a last bold attempt to solve the problem 
because we cannot explain the homeward flight of the bee in any other way”?  In order to 
find out, we must perform another experiment.  In this experiment, when a bee has 
arrived at its feeding place it is imprisoned in a dark box for several hours.  When it is 
finally released, the position of the sun has changed dramatically.  Now “the newly freed 
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bee will seek its hive in the wrong direction,” a direction determined by the angle 
between the bee and the sun.  Once it has traveled a distance equal to that between the 
hive and the feeding place, “the bee stops its linear flight altogether.  It then buzzes 
around looking for its hive which it will eventually find as long as the distance between 
the hive and its present position has not become too great” (245).  Having summarized 
the facts of the experiment, Heidegger turns to a philosophical evaluation.   
 
3.5  Driven behavior and the disinhibiting ring 
 Heidegger asks what is going on when the bee sets out to find the hive.  He 
resists the temptation to say that the bee “notices” the sun’s angle and the distance 
traveled, because noticing “always involves noticing something with regard to some end, 
with intent to something.”  The bee, however, “is absorbed by a direction, is driven to 
produce this direction out of itself – without regard to the destination.  The bee does not 
at all comport itself toward particular things, like the hive, the feeding place and so on” 
(246).  Heidegger views the bee’s behavior as essentially driven.  The bee has a drive to 
strike out in a particular direction determined by the sun’s angle; this drive can be 
overridden by the drive to return home once the bee is within the familiar environment of 
the hive.  All of the bee’s behavior can be described in terms of various drives which can 
exert inhibitory effects on each other:  “There is no apprehending, but only a behaving 
here, a driven activity which we must grasp in this way because the possibility of 
apprehending something as something is withheld from the animal” (247).  The animal is 
world-poor because it is captivated by various things – the sun, the scent of flowers, and 
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so on – but never experiences beings as beings.  The animal “does not possess the 
possibility of attending either to the being that it itself is or to beings other than itself” 
(248).   
 Instead of attending to the present-at-hand, “the animal surrounds itself with 
a disinhibiting ring which prescribes what can affect or occasion its behaviour” (255, 
emphasis original).  The animal’s various instinctive drives are disinhibited, or made 
active, whenever that animal comes into contact with certain features of its enviroment 
(the disinhibiting ring).  Heidegger recognizes the similarity of his interpretation to the 
physiological concept of stimulus and response, but feels that the physiological 
interpretation “is all too clearly oriented around a comparison with mechanical relations.”  
One must not lose sight of the fact that whatever can be stimulated is “already related and 
indeed must be related to that which is supposed to be able to stimulate it” (256).  Such 
prior relationship explains why a particular animal might be completely unresponsive to 
certain stimuli:  the animal “does not have any intrinsic drives that are oriented in this 
direction.  It is not instinctually open for this particular possibility of disinhibition” (257).   
 Heidegger credits von Uexküll with the investigations which revealed the 
extent to which the organism is bound to its environment.  Previous investigations “were 
based upon the fundamentally misconceived idea that the animal is present at hand, and 
then subsequently adapts itself to a world that is present at hand” (263).  Von Uexküll 
sought instead “to acquire insight into the relational structure between the animal and its 
environment,” where Heidegger identifies “environment” with his own “disinhibiting 
ring” (263, emphasis original).  Heidegger does not agree entirely with von Uexküll, in 
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particular on the latter’s interpretation of the concept of organism.  Heidegger thinks von 
Uexküll’s investigations could lead to “a more radical interpretation of the organism” in 
which “the totality of the organism would not merely consist in the corporeal totality of 
the animal,” but in the “original totality which is circumscribed by what we called the 
disinhibiting ring.”  Despite his philosophical disagreements with von Uexküll, 
Heidegger urges us to recognize “that the engagement with concrete investigations like 
[von Uexküll’s] is one of the most fruitful things that philosophy can learn from 
contemporary biology” (263). 
 
3.6  A proper approach to science 
 Heidegger devoted a substantial portion of his Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics to the philosophical interpretation of scientific experiments.  It is clear that 
we cannot therefore take Heidegger to be in any sense anti-scientific, or averse to the 
possibility of informing phenomenological investigations with scientific data.  Perhaps 
the project of merging phenomenology and cognitive science is not lost.  Yet we must be 
careful to approach science in the proper manner.  We cannot interpret an animal’s 
behavior in terms of an already existing conception of the organism, whether physico-
chemical, vitalistic, or otherwise.  Rather, we must remain open to the possibility of 
reinterpreting our concept of the organism based on our observations.  Our task is to gain 
insight into an organism’s world, and from there to seek the essence of the organism 
itself. 
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Chapter 4 
Phenomenology and Cognitive Science:  Toward a 
Reconciliation 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter One of this thesis introduced some of the main tenets of cognitive 
science, particularly the computational model of mind, and briefly outlined some 
criticisms of these tenets.  At that time it was tentatively suggested that a 
phenomenological approach might be useful in overcoming the difficulties identified by 
the critics.  Chapter Two took a detailed look at one particular attempt at combining 
phenomenology and cognitive science, and pointed out some of the faults of this 
approach.  Having outlined some of Martin Heidegger’s own thoughts about scientific 
experiment in Chapter Three, we must now revisit the topics introduced in the earlier 
chapters, in order to see if we are any closer to a truly phenomenological understanding 
of cognitive science. 
 
4.2  Brooks revisited 
 One of the critics of the computational model of mind introduced in Chapter One 
was Rodney Brooks, and it was noted that his approach to cognitive science had some 
similarities to Heidegger’s thought, despite the fact that Brooks claims not to have been 
influenced by Heidegger.  These similarities are now even more striking in light of 
Heidegger’s explanation of the behavior of bees.  Recall that the bees’ behavior was 
described as purely “driven,” the result of a number of simple drives that normally keep 
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each other in check.  The bees’ environment played the role of a “disinhibiting ring,” 
containing a number of stimuli which could cause the bees’ various drives to become 
manifested as behaviors such as flying in a straight line or sucking honey.  As it turns out, 
Heidegger’s analysis of the bees’ behavior could also describe the functioning of Brooks’ 
robotic Creatures. 
 Brooks describes in detail the design of one of his Creatures named Allen.  Allen 
is composed of three layers of controlling circuits that operate largely independently of 
each other.  One layer is able to “communicate” with another only by suppressing or 
inhibiting its control signals.  For example, one layer has a wander function, which 
selects a random heading and tells the robot to go in that direction.  This function can be 
inhibited by the collision-detecting functions of another layer, which are activated 
whenever the robot’s sonar detects an object in its path (Brooks 408-11).  Just as bees 
will strike out in a particular direction, only to stop when a certain distance has been 
traveled and begin searching for the hive, so will Allen move in one direction until an 
object is detected, then stop and look for an unobstructed path. 
 Heidegger’s description of the bees’ driven behavior was intended in part to 
illustrate the fact that the bees are world-poor:  beings such as the sun and the hive are 
accessible to the bees, but they can never be apprehended as sun or as beehive.  Only 
world-forming beings such as humans can truly comport themselves to other beings.  
Likewise, Brooks intends his Creatures to serve as models for animal, rather than human, 
behavior.  Brooks contends that animal intelligence is far older, on an evolutionary scale, 
than human intelligence, and questions the wisdom of AI researchers’ attempts to 
replicate human behavior without first understanding more basic systems (Brooks 396-7). 
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 One of Brooks’ chief complaints about standard AI research is its use of 
abstraction.  He notes that most AI programs deal not with real-world data, but with “a 
restricted set of simple assertions deduced from the real data by humans” (399).  Brooks 
cites von Uexküll’s concept of the “perceptual world” or Merkwelt, and speculates that 
the point of abstraction is to ensure “that the program experiences the same ‘perceptual 
world’ [. . .] as humans” (400).  However, Brooks objects to the use of abstraction, on the 
grounds that “each animal species, and clearly each robot species with its own distinctly 
nonhuman sensor suites, will have its own different Merkwelt” (400).  Recall that 
Heidegger identified Merkwelt with the “disinhibiting ring,” and claimed that “individual 
animals and species of animal are restricted to a quite specific manifold of possible 
stimuli” (FCM 257). 
 Brooks is correct that abstract thinking is not the most primordial form of human 
involvement with the world, and it is likely that the type of complex behavior usually 
associated with human intelligence would not be possible without an underlying substrate 
of simple driven systems such as Brooks designs for his Creatures.  Recall Heidegger’s 
distinction in Being and Time between the present-at-hand (the mode of appearing of the 
hammer considered as an object) and the more primordial ready-to-hand (the mode of 
appearing of the hammer while it is in use).  Even when we are involved in abstract 
thinking, we may still exhibit the driven behavior of animals.  But while it may be foolish 
to begin an analysis of human behavior with abstract thinking, neither must we leave 
abstraction entirely out of the picture.  For what Brooks refers to as “abstraction” bears 
some resemblance to the “world-forming” activity of human beings. 
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 Consider what it means to say that the bee has its own particular Merkwelt.  The 
bee is able to attend to a certain very specific set of beings, and then only in particular 
prescribed ways.  The bee cannot function outside of its preferred environment.  When 
the bee is kept in a dark enclosure until the sun has changed position, its navigational 
drive becomes useless and the bee flies off in the wrong direction.  And while the bee 
could be said to “use” the sun to navigate, the bee could never use the sun to tell time.  
Man is world-forming precisely because he is not bound by a particular Merkwelt.  Only 
humans (or other world-forming beings) can produce new beings, not in the ontic sense 
(as with tool-making), but in the ontological sense.  Only world-forming beings can cause 
the sun to appear in new ways, as a time-keeping tool, or a gaseous celestial body.  It is 
man’s world-forming ability which allows him to adapt to new environments, with new 
ways of seeing and thinking. 
 
4.3  Searle revisited 
 The phenomenological distinction between world-poor and world-forming beings 
also helps us sort through some of the muddled thinking of John Searle regarding 
intentionality and meaning.  Recall that in his Chinese Room thought experiment, Searle 
claimed that a person who used only a set of formal rules to generate correct answers to 
written Chinese questions could not truly be said to “understand” Chinese.  Likewise, 
Searle contended that a computer program, which does nothing more than manipulate 
symbols, could never be said to think or understand.  While Searle’s claims might seem 
intuitive, he is at a loss to explain exactly why the machine does not understand.  He 
claims that “symbol manipulations by themselves don’t have any intentionality” (Searle 
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199), and that only something with “the same causal powers as brains” (203) is capable 
of thought.  His final conclusion is that intentionality “is a biological phenomenon” 
resulting from the particular biochemistry of human beings (204). 
 If we adopt Heidegger’s view, we can avoid the ambiguity of the term 
“intentionality”, as well as the surprising conclusion that thought must be rooted in 
biochemistry.  Where Searle uses the term “intentionality,” or directedness, Heidegger 
would identify at least two ways in which a being can be directed toward another:  
captivation  (as the bee is captivated by the sun), and comportment (as a human being 
comports himself towards the sun).  Comportment is possible only for world-forming 
beings, while the world-poor are capable only of captivation.   
 It should be clear that Roger Schank’s programs, which inspired Searle’s Chinese 
Room scenario, are at best world-poor.  Schank’s programs are designed to take as their 
input stories about a particular topic (specifically, restaurants) as well as a certain 
prescribed set of questions about that topic.  Just as the bee is restricted to its own bee-
world, able to function only in a specific environment, so are Schank’s machines limited 
to their own world.  They are captivated by certain symbols, but can never comport 
themselves to those symbols, or to the things those symbols represent.  When removed 
from their prescribed domain, Schank’s machines are as unable to function properly as 
are the bees when the sun is hidden.  The machines’ incapability to understand is not due 
to the fact that they lack “intentionality,” but that they are poor in world. 
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4.4  World formation, organs, and physiology 
What, then, is needed for a being to be world-forming?  Is biology a factor?  Both 
Searle on one hand, and Winograd and Flores on the other, seem to think that human 
thought or cognition is somehow dependent on human physiology or biochemistry.  The 
question of whether a claim like “Man is world-forming” could depend on biological 
claims calls to mind the circular movement discussed in Fundamental Concepts of 
Metaphysics.  For if we say that a human being’s world, or his capacity for world-
formation, is due to his having certain types of neurons, on what do we base this 
assertion?  Aren’t neurons themselves phenomena, and isn’t the science which discovers 
them the result of man’s world-forming essence? 
 The question of the role of physiology essentially asks whether our mental 
capacities are dependent on our organs, and whether the functioning of our organs can be 
reduced to physics or chemistry.  To answer it, we must return to Fundamental Concepts 
of Metaphysics, where Heidegger asks this very question.  In considering the question of 
the proper delimiting of the field of zoology, Heidegger comes across the traditional 
distinction between the “organic” and the “inorganic.”  This raises the question:  What is 
organic?  What is an organism?  Heidegger replies, “An organism is something which 
possesses organs.  The word ‘organ’ derives from the Greek !"#$%!% or ‘instrument’” 
(FCM 213).   
It is important at this point to recall the important role that instrumentality plays in 
Heidegger’s phenomenology.  An “instrument” for Heidegger is not an object that stands 
over and against the user.  An instrument, when in use, is absorbed in the activity, and is 
only noticed as an object when it fails to perform its function.  Equipment, instruments, 
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and machines “are neither simply worldless, like the stone, nor are they ever poor in 
world [. . . They] are worldless, yet as worldless belong to world” (213).  Instruments are 
a product of human activity, and are thus dependent on man’s capacity for world-
formation.  This dependence is ontical, not ontological:  we do not mean that instruments 
must be a product of human activity in the sense that they must be manufactured.  A rock 
that is picked up and used as a hammer is an instrument, even though it was not fashioned 
by man.  However, it exists as an instrument, as a hammer, by virtue of the human 
activity of hammering. 
The activity always precedes the instrument.  A hammer exists for hammering; 
thus the “for-hammering” is a necessary condition of the hammer.  “All equipment is 
what it is and the way it is only within a particular context.  This context is determined by 
a totality of involvements [Bewandtnisganzheit] in each case” (215). 
 Heidegger next considers the question of whether an organ is an 
instrument.  Were this the case, we would have to conclude, perhaps contrary to intuition, 
that even biological organs are dependent upon the activity for which they are used.  
More precisely, Heidegger asks, “Can the animal see because it has eyes, or does it have 
eyes because it can see?”  He concludes that “It is the potentiality for seeing which first 
makes the possession of eyes possible”.  This raises a more fundamental question:  “How 
must a being be in the first place, such that this possibility of the potentiality for seeing 
can belong to its specific manner of being?” (218) 
Whatever makes seeing possible must not rest on mere physiology.  Animal 
seeing and human seeing are not the same thing, despite the fact that “human beings and 
animals both possess eyes and even the anatomical structure of the eye is alike in both 
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cases.”  Furthermore, even if we consider only animal seeing, there is an important 
distinction between the eye as an animal’s organ of sight and the pen as an instrument of 
writing, a distinction which goes beyond the simple fact that the two are intended for 
different sorts of activity:  “The pen is an independent being, something that is to hand 
for use by various different human beings.  The eye, on the contrary, as an organ is never 
present at hand in this way for those beings that need and use it.”  Heidegger is now able 
to define organ provisionally as “an instrument which is incorporated into the user” 
(219). 
Already we can see a potential problem for the reductionist who wishes to ground 
human mental activity in neurophysiology.  When a scientist examines brain cells or 
nerve tissue in an attempt to discover what makes thought possible, the cells and tissue 
under investigation are not the same as the cells and tissue being used to ponder the 
problem.  This is true not just in the trivial sense that a doctor cannot examine his own 
brain while he is using it.  Rather, the objects of study are a fundamentally different kind 
of being from the brain and nerves in use, as organs or instruments.  They appear in 
different ways, just as the hammer in use appears as an item of gear rather than as a 
distinct object.  Brain cells and nerve tissue only appear to the neuroscientist as objects 
because he is involved in the kind of activity that makes them appear as such.  The 
radical move of phenomenology was to start not with a theoretical understanding, in 
which the world is understood as a collection of physical objects into which the person 
must somehow be made to fit, but with experience itself.  Any attempt to explain 
phenomenological experience in terms of present-at-hand objects neglects the very 
purpose of phenomenology. 
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Nevertheless, scientific investigation may still serve a purpose, and Heidegger 
draws an example from biology to illustrate his point about the priority of activity over 
organs.  He considers the case of one-celled creatures, amoebae and infusoria.  In these 
creatures there are few, if any, permanent organs, only pseudopods:  “They have to form 
their necessary organs individually in each case, only to destroy them again in turn.”  
Quoting von Uexküll, Heidegger explains that these creatures feed by forming, around 
the food, “an aperture which first becomes a mouth, then a stomach, then an intestine and 
finally an anal tract.”  Heidegger then concludes “that the capacities for feeding and for 
digesting are prior to the organs in each case” (224). 
Despite the similarities between organs and instruments, Heidegger is not quite 
ready to view organs as simply a special case of instruments – as instruments that happen 
to be attached to their user, for example.  In considering organs to be instruments, one 
“fails to consider the organ in terms of the organism.”  When the organism is considered 
in the proper fashion, “the specific manner of being proper to living beings does 
announce itself” (225).   
The organ does not relate to its activity in quite the same way as does equipment.  
“The eye is not serviceable for seeing in the way in which the pen is serviceable for 
writing.  Rather the organ stands in service of the capacity that develops it” (226).  A 
completed piece of equipment is serviceable for something, but the organ is subservient 
to its capacity.  Heidegger goes on to distinguish between “readiness for something and 
capacity for something.  A piece of equipment like a pen, for example, is ready for 
writing but it is not capable of writing” (227).  Neither is an eye capable of seeing, except 
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as it is considered as part of the organism to which it belongs.  Capacity belongs to 
organism, and organs belong to capacity.   
 
4.5  Conclusion 
What can Heidegger’s investigation of the nature of organs and organisms tell us 
about the proper relationship between phenomenology and cognitive science?  How is the 
scientific study of mind to proceed if it is to be valuable from a phenomenological 
standpoint?  For one thing, we must not attempt to understand the mind by breaking it 
down into parts.  An organism is more than just a collection of organs, and the organs 
cannot be understood except in terms of the organism.  Just as the Victorian phrenologists 
had an improper conception of the brain, which posited the existence of a number of 
discrete cerebral organs corresponding to each human faculty or virtue, so, too, do 
cognitive scientists misunderstand the mind when they try too hard to break its 
functioning down into discrete subsystems.  The failure of the traditional approach to 
artificial intelligence, with its high level of abstraction, was to treat the mind as a sort of 
central processing device which could be hooked up to a number of natural or artificial 
sense organs. 
We also must not proceed as if the mind were nothing more than a level of 
explanation above the physical.  It is wrong to think that we have not “really” explained 
some mental faculty until we have accounted for it in physiological terms.  The mind (in 
the sense of one’s mental faculties) and the brain (in the sense of physiology) are 
ontologically distinct.  When the phenomenologist asks, “How is it that this being has 
some particular capacity?” he is dealing with a different set of beings entirely than the 
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scientist who asks, “What physical system could produce this sort of behavior?”  If a 
scientific study of the mind is to be grounded in a phenomenological understanding, it 
must ask a different sort of questions than the reductionist or the behaviorist.  The study 
of the behavior of humans or animals must seek to answer the question, “What sort of 
being is capable of this behavior?”  Likewise, the neurophysiologist, in studying some 
part of the brain or nervous system, must ask, “What capacity makes such an organ 
possible?”  In short, the physical must be explained in terms of the phenomenological, 
rather than the other way around. 
There is still a long way to go before there can be any serious cooperation 
between phenomenology and cognitive science.  The two fields have as their objects very 
different sorts of beings.  Yet hopefully we have seen that the notion of using science to 
inform phenomenology is not a misguided one.  As long as phenomenological 
investigation and scientific experimentation are kept in their proper relationship to one 
another, the two can be used together as powerful tools for understanding ourselves and 
our faculties. 
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